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  To Mediate or Adjudicate? An 
Alternative for Resolving Whistleblower Disputes 
at the Hanford Nuclear Site 
            Angela Day* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On a sunny morning in 1997, seven pipefitters working at the Hanford 
Nuclear Site (Hanford) refused to install a valve in a pipe that would be 
used to transfer high-level nuclear waste from tank to tank.1 The workers 
expressed concerns that the valve was potentially unsafe, asserting that it 
was not rated to handle the pressure test outlined in the job specifications.2 
After they refused to install the valve, they were sent home and laid off.3 
The pipefitters filed a complaint with the US Department of Labor 
(DOL), the agency tasked with adjudicating claims related to whistleblower 
protections.4 The workers claimed retaliatory discharge under the federal 
Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974.5 The ERA, as amended, applies 
to workers employed at commercial and defense sites, including contractors 
hired by the US Department of Energy (DOE). The pipefitters were 
employed by DOE contractor Fluor Federal Services. After a DOL 
investigator ruled in favor of the workers, Fluor agreed to reinstate them.6 
                                                                                                       
*  Angela Day is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the 
University of Washington. This article is part of a larger study supported by a grant from 
the Harry S. Bridges Center for Labor Studies at the University of Washington. 
1 Annette Cary, Court Upholds Hanford Pipefitter $4.8M Jury Award, TRI-CITY 
HERALD, Sept. 5, 2008, http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2008/09/05/305618/court-
upholds-hanford-pipefitter.html. 
2 Brundridge v. Fluor Fed. Servs., Inc., 191 P.3d 879, 884 (2008). 
3  Id. 
4  Id. 
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
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But in 1998, Fluor again laid off the seven workers, as well as four 
additional workers who claimed they were targeted for supporting the 
original group.7 
The eleven workers filed claims with the DOL alleging retaliatory 
discharge for the 1998 dismissals, but ultimately withdrew them to pursue 
their claims in court.8 In 1999, the eleven workers filed a lawsuit in Benton 
County Superior Court, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy.9 In 2008—eleven years after the original incident—the Washington 
Supreme Court upheld a 2005 jury award of $4.8 million in damages for the 
workers and $1.4 million in attorney fees.10 Plaintiffs’ attorney Jack 
Sheridan stated, “[the pipefitters] stood up for safety when everyone else 
put their heads down for fear of being fired. It took a while, but this 
decision proves that the system works.”11 
While the eleven pipefitters were vindicated in court, their struggle lasted 
over a decade and, if the experiences of other high profile whistleblowers 
are any indication, it surely took a toll on their professional, personal, and 
financial lives.12 The lengthy proceedings focused on the legal question of 
whether these workers were wrongfully discharged, rather than on the 
policies or practices that gave rise to the original safety concern.13 For 
                                                                                                       
7  Id. 
8  Id.  
9 Id. 
10 Cary, supra note 1. 
11 Id. 
12  See, e.g., C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL POWER 1–2 (2001) (summarizing the experiences of whistleblowers 
interviewed in the book); id. at 125–27 (drawing conclusions about why whistleblowers 
ultimately sacrifice personal and professional relationships); MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & 
PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER, WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT 
AND INDUSTRY 3–8 (summarizing the risks that whistleblowers face); id. at 239–40 
(describing the forces that make “dissent increasingly dangerous”). 
13  The DOL is mandated to investigate and make a determination about whether an 
employee was wrongfully discharged for engaging in a “protected activity,” such as 
raising a safety concern, and whether the employee faced “adverse action” as a result of 
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workers remaining on the job, this incident and subsequent proceedings can 
create a “chilling effect,” which has been defined as “the unwillingness or 
reluctance of workers to engage in protected activity (i.e., to raise concerns) 
because of a fear of retaliation or reprisal.”14 In short, retaliation against the 
pipefitters for raising a concern seems likely to discourage workers from 
speaking out about health, safety, or environmental concerns that could 
result in an accident. 
The pipefitters’ case could have been resolved through an alternative to 
the traditional system that federal whistleblower statutes or state laws 
outline. At Hanford, private contractors and members of public interest 
groups agreed to establish—with the support of the DOE and elected 
officials—a council for resolving concerns that operates outside of 
administrative claims and court proceedings (the Hanford Council, or 
Council).15 This alternative approach is different from other forms of 
mediation or arbitration that are generally available to parties at any point in 
                                                                                                       
their protected activity. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS 
MANUAL 2–7 (2011), available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_02-
03-003.pdf. Investigations are carried out by the DOL’s Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA). Id. at 1–16. The Washington Supreme Court focused on the 
issue of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Brundridge, 191 P.3d at 885. 
The court summarized the legal question as follows: “(1) that a clear public policy exists 
(the ‘clarity’ element), (2) that discouraging the conduct in which the employee engaged 
would jeopardize the public policy (the ‘jeopardy’ element), and (3) that the employee's 
public-policy-related conduct caused the dismissal (the ‘causation’ element).” Id.  
14  BILLIE PIRNER GARDE, REPORT TO THE U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AUTHORITY, 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND JURISDICTION OF THE DOE, EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM TO 
ENSURE EMPLOYEES MAY RAISE CONCERNS WITHOUT FEAR OF REPRISAL 6 n.12 (2000) 
(on file with author). See also U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, NRC 
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 26 (Aug. 1998), available at http://www.orau.org/ptp/ 
PTP%20Library/library/NRC/NUREG/0195/Ch1-8.pdf (describing a chilling effect as 
discrimination “broadly defined and should include intimidation or harassment that could 
lead a person to reasonably expect that, if he or she makes allegations about what he or 
she believes are unsafe conditions, the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment could be affected”). 
15  See History, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/ 
doc/council_history.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
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the litigation process or that are mandated by labor agreements.16 The 
Hanford Council is granted authority to resolve worker concerns through a 
charter, which serves as a touchstone for the resolution process.17 Workers 
are not required to engage in litigation, secure legal counsel, file formal 
claims, or incur any expense.18 The resolution process focuses on the 
circumstances that gave rise to a worker’s concern rather than on procedural 
requirements or legal questions.19 Although the pipefitters’ employer, Fluor 
Federal Services, was a signatory to the Council’s charter in 1997,20 and the 
dispute could have been resolved through this mechanism, the case 
proceeded through the traditional system of administrative adjudication and 
court proceedings. Comparing this case to those resolved through the 
Hanford Council, this article proposes that the alternative model does more 
to further the policy goal of protecting workers who raise concerns than 
does the traditional model outlined in whistleblower statutes such as the 
                                                                                                       
16 See, e.g., JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 53 (1997). “Society now has a growing interst in arbitration a 
the faster, more economical, and preferred means of resolving employment disputs, 
particularly as they concern rights protected by state and federal statutes.” Id. See also id. 
at 75 (describing the proliferation of employer mandated arbitration agreements); id. at 
90 (regarding enforceability). 
17  See Hanford Concerns Council Charter, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, 
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/council_charter.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 
2012). 
18  Bringing Concerns to the Council: Questions and Answers, HANFORD CONCERNS 
COUNCIL, http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/bring_qna.htm (last visited Nov. 
24, 2012). 
19  HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT 2010 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/report_progressreport2010.pdf 
[hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT 2010].  
Unlike adversarial forums for resolving disputes, the Council focuses on 
preserving an employee’s career progress and resolving the underlying issues 
that gave rise to the dispute. Instead of seeking to assign blame, the process 
focuses on addressing the underlying safety, health, or environmental concerns 
and fostering shared goals for a safety-conscious workplace. 
Id. 
20  See HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, supra note 15. 
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ERA or the litigation options granted in some federal and state statutes.21 
Implicit in the policy goal of whistleblower protection is a desire to 
prevent catastrophic accidents that could harm workers, the environment, 
and members of the public. This article argues that the promise of achieving 
safe operations by granting formal legal rights to raise concerns in the 
workplace is best fulfilled through an alternative approach to administrative 
claims and litigation. Finally, this article suggests that the conditions which 
gave rise to this alternative model at Hanford are not unique to this site or 
statute and that lessons learned from the Hanford Council alternative 
method offer principles to guide similar alternative mechanisms towards 
similar ends. 
To reach these conclusions, Part II of this article reviews the 
circumstances that gave rise to the formation of the Hanford Council. It 
identifies the interests of elected officials, agency leaders, private 
contractors, and public-interest advocates that led these groups to agreement 
on this alternative model, and proposes a general framework for identifying 
when interests might align and lead to agreement on an alternative 
approach. As part of this analysis, Part II provides a theoretical discussion 
about the intended goals of traditional dispute resolution models, and makes 
the case that alternative dispute resolution models may be more effective in 
achieving underlying policy goals in some circumstances. 
Part III of the article reviews outcomes achieved by the Hanford Council 
and suggests theoretical underpinnings that, if followed, may give rise to 
similar outcomes in different situations. Part IV reviews lessons learned 
from the Hanford Council. It suggests principles necessary to underpin and 
                                                                                                       
21  Eighteen states have enacted public policy exceptions to at-will employment, 
recognizing that raising concerns is anathema to the public interest. See generally 
THOMAS DEVINE & TAREK MAASSARANI, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, RUNNING 
THE GAUNTLET: THE CAMPAIGN FOR CREDIBLE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER RIGHTS 
(2008), available at http://www.whistleblower.org/storage/documents/ 
RunningTheGauntletpdf.pdf. 
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sustain alternative models in disputes ranging from hazardous waste 
cleanup and energy production to natural resource and land use disputes. 
II. CHOOSING A MECHANISM FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
A. Conditions that Prompted a Shift to an Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism at the Hanford Site 
The Hanford Nuclear Site, located in the desert of southeastern 
Washington State, produced plutonium during World War II and the Cold 
War.22 Throughout the years of plutonium production, over 25 million cubic 
feet of solid waste was dumped at the site, and an estimated 400 million 
gallons of liquid waste was dumped into the soil and groundwater.23 
Currently, 56 million gallons of high-level nuclear waste are stored in 177 
underground tanks, awaiting treatment and long-term storage.24 The DOE is 
tasked with cleaning up the 586 square-mile site—a challenge that is 
estimated to cost billions over the next several decades.25 
As the Cold War came to a close and site operations began to focus on 
cleanup in the early 1990s, a number of whistleblower concerns made their 
way to the courts and into the local and national press.26 Reflecting on this 
time period, Council Chair Jonathan Brock stated, “lengthy lawsuits, 
negative newspaper coverage, congressional or state legislative hearings 
                                                                                                       
22  See Hanford History, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/ 
programs/nwp/hanford.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2012).  
23  ROY E. GEPHART, A SHORT HISTORY OF HANFORD WASTE GENERATION, STORAGE, 
AND RELEASE 8–9 (4th rev..2003), available at http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/ 
external/technical_reports/PNNL-13605rev4.pdf. 
24  Tank Farms, HANFORD, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/ 
TankFarms (last visited Dec. 13, 2012). 
25  Peter Eisler, Problems Plague Cleanup at Hanford Nuclear Waste Site, USA TODAY, 
Jan. 18, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/environment/story/2012-01-
25/hanford-nuclear-plutonium-cleanup/52622796/1. 
26  See, e.g., GLAZER & GLAZER, supra note 12, at 171–77 (providing an account of 
whistleblower Casey Ruud, whose story was covered by the Seattle Times and national 
media, and received attention from members of Congress). 
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and other embarrassing exposure followed.”27 The coverage and exposure, 
in turn, seemed to undermine confidence in the government and contractor 
organizations responsible for site safety or environmental cleanup, and to do 
so at a substantial cost.28 
In 1992, the Washington State Department of Ecology invited the 
University of Washington to conduct a study outlining the feasibility of 
establishing a forum for alternative dispute resolution.29 After consulting 
with the DOE and its contractors, nuclear safety advocates, and elected 
officials, the University of Washington study recommended a mechanism 
for resolving individual whistleblower cases, but noted that “a case review 
mechanism would only be successful if it had legitimacy in the eyes of the 
broad range of interested parties.”30 
In 1994, with the agreement of all relevant stakeholders, the DOE 
sponsored the chartering of the Hanford Council—formally known as the 
Hanford Joint Council for Resolving Employee Concerns.31 The Council 
was comprised of representatives of DOE contractors, nuclear safety 
                                                                                                       
27  Jonathan Brock, Full and Fair Resolution of Whistleblower Issues: The Hanford Joint 
Council for Resolving Employee Concerns, a Pilot ADR Approach, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 
497, 501 (1999) (providing a detailed account of news coverage and public and political 
attention to Hanford). 
28  See MICHAEL D’ANTONIO, ATOMIC HARVEST: HANFORD AND THE LETHAL TOLL OF 
AMERICA’S NUCLEAR ARSENAL (1993) (detailing an account of news coverage, and 
public and political attention paid to Hanford and DE Weapons Complex). See also 
Brock, supra note 27, at 501. 
29  Betty Jane Narver et al., INST. PUB. POL’Y AND MGMT., UNIV. WASH., External 
Third-Party Review of Significant Employee Concerns: The Joint Cooperative Council 
for Hanford Disputes (Univ. of Wash. Graduate School of Pub. Affairs, Working Paper 
No. 93-9, June 1992), available at http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/ 
council_resources_uwpapers.pdf. 
30  Brock, supra note 27, at 507. 
31  See HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, supra note 15 (describing a history of the 
evolution of the council). As described later in the article, the Hanford Joint Council 
briefly ceased operations and reorganized in 2005 as the Hanford Concerns Council. Id. 
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advocates, a former whistleblower, and neutral members.32 Acceptance of 
all cases and recommended resolutions would be by consensus only, and, as 
agreed to in the charter, all recommendations of the Council were 
“presumptively implemented” by the contractor.33 In other words, the 
parties signed an ex-ante agreement to implement all consensus resolutions. 
What prompted these parties to agree to an alternative approach to 
resolving disputes? The following discussion analyzes how each group’s 
interests led to agreement on an alternative forum, and proposes a 
generalizable framework for identifying when interests may align to form 
an alternate mechanism for dispute resolution in other circumstances. 
1. Elected Officials and Agency Leaders 
Both elected officials and agency leaders had an interest in finding a 
more efficient way to deal with whistleblower complaints. Elected officials 
were spending time in hearings and answering questions from the press as a 
result of whistleblower cases in the courts.34 Stakeholders, such as Hanford 
workers and nuclear safety advocates, came to elected officials and agency 
leaders to voice their disagreement about worker protection practices at the 
site. Elected officials from the state of Washington wanted the site cleaned 
up, safely and without diverting resources to litigation. In the same vein, 
DOE agency leaders received scrutiny in congressional hearings and in the 
local and national press.35 Given these drawbacks, elected officials from 
Washington State and agency leaders at the DOE were willing to shift from 
the traditional system of courts and administrative claims outlined in 
                                                                                                       
32  A Membership that Ensures Neutrality, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, 
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/work_neutrality.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 
2012). 
33  Hanford Concerns Council Charter, supra note 17. 
34  Brock, supra note 27, at 507. 
35  Id. at 506, 526. 
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whistleblower statutes to a consensual process.36 
2. Private Contractors 
Contractors hired by the DOE had an interest in developing a system that 
would resolve concerns with less publicity and expense than the traditional 
system. Contractors were spending funds on legal fees and management 
time on responding to subpoenas, congressional hearings, and media 
requests. Confidence in the contractors’ ability to safely conduct the 
cleanup of the site waned—a potentially costly result when cleanup 
contracts next came up for bid. In short, these conditions made contractors 
willing to shift away from a system of administrative claims and court 
proceedings to an alternative approach. 
3. Public Interest Advocates 
 Public interest advocates supported a system that would increase worker 
safety while maintaining focus on cleanup operations. Advocates spent 
significant amounts of time and resources bringing congressional and media 
attention to these important issues and initiating court proceedings. Yet, 
although they were often successful in court, they did not believe that 
individual cases brought about changes in worker protection policies and 
practices, or they thought the changes were too incremental and slow to 
protect workers commencing cleanup of the site. Therefore, advocates were 
also willing to engage in an alternative mechanism that could reduce their 
costs and potentially further their goals more quickly and efficiently. 
In short, each of these groups had an interest in the safe and efficient 
cleanup of the site and in worker protection. Because all of these groups 
were dissatisfied with the traditional system, they were willing to try an 
alternative. This may not be the case in every situation where there are 
                                                                                                       
36  See HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, supra note 15 (providing statements from 
Washington State elected officials). 
626 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
WHISTLEBLOWING 
repeat interactions among stakeholders around a common issue or at a 
single site. But the following table suggests a framework for recognizing 
when interests may align and allow for the development of an alternative 
approach. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Conditions under which Parties May Select 
Adjudication or Mediation 
 
Conditions under which Parties 
May Prefer a Traditional Model of 
Dispute Resolution 
Conditions under which Parties 
May Prefer an Alternative 
Mechanism for Dispute Resolution 
Legislators/Agency Leaders: in 
situations in which relying on the 
courts or administrative review 
helps to achieve broader goals or 
where public and media attention is 
desired, elected officials and agency 
leaders may prefer adjudication by a 
third party  
Legislators/Agency Leaders: 
when traditional means of resolving 
disputes create unwanted political 
attention that detracts from broader 
goals, elected officials and agency 
leaders may prefer an alternative 
approach that focuses on mutual 
goals 
Business Interests: in instances 
where formalized filing and 
standing procedures and precedent-
based decisions are desired, 
disputants are likely to prefer formal 
adjudicatory resolution mechanisms  
Business Interests: when 
administrative review and litigation 
heighten the costs of dispute 
resolution—both in terms of time, 
legal costs, or even negative 
publicity—disputants may prefer an 
alternative approach which can 
reduce those costs  
Public Interest Advocates: in 
instances where heightened media 
and political attention to an issue 
seems likely to help accomplish 
Public Interest Advocates: if there 
is (or has been) legislative resistance 
to change, and if prior litigation 
efforts have been unsuccessful in 
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larger goals for changes in policies 
or practices, public interest 
advocates are likely to prefer 
traditional means of dispute 
resolution  
changing underlying policies and 
practices, public interest advocates 
may prefer an alternative approach 
 
B. Theoretical Underpinnings of Traditional and Alternative Methods of 
Dispute Resolution 
This section analyzes why the traditional model of administrative 
adjudication and court proceedings is often the default mechanism for 
resolving claims or ensuring that policies are implemented as intended. It 
suggests how and why important decisions are often delegated to a judge or 
other adjudicative body to resolve disputes, and the potential impact of that 
delegation on important policy issues. Second, this section suggests why 
important problems may be left unresolved and why policy goals may 
remain unfulfilled when dispute resolution authority is delegated to a third 
party. Finally, it suggests why an alternative to the traditional system of 
third party adjudication may be more effective for achieving policy goals.  
1. Delegating Dispute Resolution Authority 
Delegating authority to a third party to resolve a dispute when two parties 
cannot come to an agreement is an age-old practice. Some scholars argue 
that delegation of dispute resolution authority is becoming increasingly 
common due to the emergence of international tribunals, constitutional 
review courts, and civil litigation where a judicial authority resolves 
disputes that affect important economic and social policies.37 The reasons 
for delegating dispute resolution authority to a third party are many and 
                                                                                                       
37  See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political 
Courts, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 95, 102 (2008); TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN 
NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 1–11 (2003). 
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varied, but include legislators’ desire to delegate politically contentious 
issues to a neutral third party,38 private corporations’ desire for predictable 
processes and precedent-based outcomes,39 and advocates’ attempts to 
change accepted norms or values that underlie civil or other rights.40 Yet, 
despite these perceived advantages, there are disadvantages to delegating 
authority to a neutral third party—namely, subjecting the dispute to the 
standards and values of an outsider and losing control over publicity and 
outcomes.41 
 Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet have described the resolution of 
disputes between two parties as a circular process.42 In their conception, the 
circle begins when two disputing parties cannot come to agreement without 
delegating some authority to a third party to help resolve their differences. 
In this case, “delegation is likely when, for each disputant, going to a third 
party is less costly, or more likely to yield a desired outcome, than either 
breaking the dyadic contract and going it alone, or attempting to impose a 
particular settlement against the wishes of the other disputant.”43 In other 
words, a “dyadic” dispute between two parties leads to “triadic” dispute 
resolution when a third party is introduced. 
In the second phase of this process, the neutral third party makes a 
                                                                                                       
38  See, e.g., Mark Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the 
Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 61–70 (1993); GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE 
DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
xx–xxvi (2003).  
39  See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND 
JUDICIALIZATION 72–78 (2002). The authors' suggest shifting preferences among WTO 
members away from mediation to formal, written rulings that estalish precedent. Id. 
40  See, e.g., CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 2–3 (1998); RACHEL A. CICHOWSKI, 
THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LITIGATION, MOBILIZATION AND 
GOVERNANCE 6 (2007). 
41  SHAPIRO & STONE SWEET, supra note 39, at 69. 
42  Id. at 60–65. 
43  Id. at 61. 
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decision that is “concrete, particular, and retrospective.”44 In formal dispute 
resolution processes, this decision leads to a new “rule” to settle the specific 
conflict between the parties.45 Stated differently, this decision sets precedent 
for future resolutions and mandates compliance through compulsory rulings 
and resolutions determined by a third party. Thus, this final step in the 
circular process of individual dispute resolution leads, gradually and 
incrementally, toward broader changes in governance.46 
The legal scholars who proposed the conception of a circular process, 
Shapiro and Stone Sweet, posit that “as the scope and intensity of these 
interactions increase, so will demand for the adaptation of norms, values, 
and rules by way of formal dispute resolution. If and when dyadic dispute 
resolution fails to satisfy this demand, there will be pressure to use TDR 
[triadic dispute resolution] if a triadic mechanism exists, or to invent such a 
mechanism if it does not exist.”47 
This hypothetical discussion suggests that disputing parties will turn to a 
third party to resolve disputes, and, if no default mechanism exists, they will 
invent one. The following discussion considers how dispute resolution 
mechanisms are established and when parties are likely to turn to them. It 
suggests that delegation of dispute resolution authority comes both from the 
“top down” through legislation and from the “bottom up” (i.e., from 
members of civil society who seek to have an effect on policy through the 
courts). 
 
                                                                                                       
44  Id. at 64.  
45  Id. 
46  Id. at 59. Shapiro and Stone Sweet consider governance to be constructed through 
“strategic behavior: how individual actors conceive and pursue their interest within any 
given community; policy-making: how values and resources are distributed within any 
given community; and systemic change: how the normative structure in place in any 
given community is constructed, maintained and revised.” Id. 
47  Id. at 72. 
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2. Legislative Delegation 
Legislators may delegate decision-making authority to the courts in cases 
where the issues are politically charged or in instances where government is 
fractured along party lines.48 For example, legislators may want to take 
credit for enacting legislation in response to public pressure on issues such 
as antitrust or workplace rights, but might lack a coalition to enact specific 
rules or remedies.49 In these instances, legislators may delegate authority to 
resolve disputes in the courts through grants of standing in legislation. 
Grants of standing allow affected parties to challenge the interpretation or 
implementation of policies by bureaucratic agencies in court. Under these 
conditions, legislation establishes a system of third party adjudication that 
assigns dispute resolution authority to administrative agencies or grants 
standing to pursue claims in court. In this way, legislators delegate authority 
to the courts to develop specific rules that set precedent for the resolution of 
disputes about the intent and implementation of laws. 
This delegation of authority provides attractive political cover for elected 
policymakers, creating a buffer between elected officials and a divided 
constituency. Although delegation results in legislators’ loss of power over 
decision making, it is not unusual for this tradeoff to be judged a desirable 
one. As Ran Hirschl notes, there is a “growing reliance on adjudicative 
means for clarifying and settling fundamental moral controversies and 
highly contentious political questions[,]” which has “transformed national 
high courts into major political decision-making bodies.”50 In other words, 
the “top down” delegation of responsibility to the judiciary, though often 
attractive to legislators, also results in a delegation of power over important 
political decisions and the interpretation of legislative intent.     
                                                                                                       
48  See, e.g., Graber, supra note 38, at 61–70; LOVELL, supra note 38, at 41. 
49  Id. 
50  Hirschl, supra note 37, at 95. 
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3. Delegation by Disputing Parties 
Public interest and business advocates may appeal to legislative, 
administrative or legal forums to resolve disputes with important social or 
economic implications. When stakeholders choose to resolve disputes 
through the courts, we may think of this as delegation of dispute resolution 
authority from the “bottom up.”   
Hirschl posits that members of social movements, business groups, and 
public interest advocates are likely to choose legal over legislative forums 
when courts are perceived as “more reputable, impartial, and effective 
decision-making bodies than other institutions, which are viewed as 
bureaucracy heavy or biased.”51 For example, Shapiro and Stone Sweet 
observe this “bottom up” shift toward resolving disputes in third party 
adjudication among international business interests.52 They note that the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) established independent panels to help 
resolve disputes between companies or countries regarding contractual 
obligations under international trade agreements using a collaborative 
approach.53 Yet, the participating countries, presumably at the request of 
international businesses, enacted laws to formally enforce WTO 
agreements, and have since moved to a more formal adjudication process.54 
Similarly, Shapiro and Stone Sweet describe a shift in preferences among 
individual international businesses toward using formal court-like 
procedures, relying on precedence, and publishing decisions.55 
Rachel Cichowski observes instances of “bottom up” delegation to a 
formal authority among public interest advocates engaged in social 
                                                                                                       
51  Id. at 96.  
52  SHAPIRO & STONE SWEET, supra note 39. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
55  See id. at 75–78 (discussing the formalization of dispute resolution of international 
trade agreements under the WTO). 
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movements.56 Cichowski describes this as the “litigation dynamic,” which is 
initiated “as a result of strategic action by individuals who are either 
disadvantaged or advantaged by an available set of rules.”57 In this type of 
situation, individuals invoke a rule or procedure through a formal claim or 
court proceeding, which has broader implications for furthering their aims 
for social change.58 Cichowski cites a number of examples in which 
individual claimants have secured additional rights for the environment and 
women’s rights in the workplace through formal adjudication.59 She 
concludes that “in any system of governance with an independent judiciary 
possessing judicial review powers, the judicial decision provides a potential 
avenue for institutional change.”60 
In general, these scholars and examples suggest that individual judicial 
rulings can alter the underlying rules and norms that grant civil or other 
rights. According to Cichowski, individual rulings can effect change both 
directly, “by creating new legal rights for an individual or group that 
enables subsequent claims,” and indirectly, “by changing the rules and 
procedures in a way that impacts legislative action and creates a new set of 
rules that may become the basis for subsequent legal action.”61 
The discussion above suggests several reasons for disputing parties to 
delegate dispute resolution authority to courts and administrative agencies. 
Delegation results in increased opportunities for business interests, public 
interest advocates, and everyday citizens to bring forth formal claims or 
initiate litigation to ensure policies are implemented as intended. 
Normatively, these opportunities may be considered be benefits of the 
traditional system of administrative review and court proceedings. But the 
                                                                                                       
56  See CICHOWSKI, supra note 40, at 8. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. at 9. 
61  Id. at 12. 
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following discussion suggests that important policy goals may not be 
achieved through this traditional system, prompting, in some cases, a shift 
toward an alternative system. 
4. Leaving Problems Unresolved and Policy Goals Unfulfilled 
In order to exercise a right, gain a remedy, or effect change through a 
legal ruling as described in the section above, an individual must first be 
aware that such right of action is available to them. But legal scholar Susan 
Silbey notes, “More often than not, as we go about our daily lives, we rarely 
sense the presence of the law.”62 Further, an individual must have standing, 
which usually means that he or she must have been negatively affected by 
another party. In the case of employees who raise a concern about health, 
safety, or environment within or outside the organization (i.e., a 
whistleblower), they must prove they have been adversely affected in the 
workplace as a result of their actions. This means the whistleblower must 
prove the employer has taken an adverse action as a result of the employee 
raising a concern that is specifically protected by statute. Finally, the 
whistleblower must be capable of navigating the system of administrative 
review or court proceedings, or of employing counsel to do so.  
 Scholars have noted that grievances or disputes rarely become formal 
legal claims. Instead of pursuing administrative claims or litigation, studies 
suggest that would-be claimants may just decide to forego pursuit of their 
claims.63 This is particularly true of workers who may be reticent to bring a 
claim against their employer or assume the role of victim.64 As the example 
of the Hanford pipefitters suggests, the process of pursuing a claim through 
                                                                                                       
62  Susan S. Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 323, 332 
(2005). 
63  See Richard Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the 
Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 525 (1981). 
64  See generally KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1988). 
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administrative or legal processes may take years and exact a toll on a 
worker’s financial and emotional resources. 
As the pipefitters’ example suggests, for every worker who speaks out 
about a health, safety, or environmental concern, there may be many more 
who remain silent. Without workers or managers raising concerns outside 
their chains of command or outside their organizations, serious safety issues 
may go unaddressed. Silence ultimately defeats the purposes of 
whistleblower protection laws, which, in the case of nuclear facilities, are 
intended to prevent injury to workers or the public and avoid environmental 
damage. 
Because all parties at Hanford shared mutual goals for safe operations 
and a focus on cleanup, they looked toward an alternative dispute resolution 
system that could focus on those mutual interests, lower the potential risks 
and costs to concerned workers and their employers, and retain control of 
the dispute resolution process. 
 5. Shifting to an Alternative Approach 
Disputes resolved through mediation focus on mutual gains and future 
interactions, and this approach may result in more sustainable solutions and 
outcomes than a traditional approach. For example, some evidence suggests 
that disputes resolved through mediation can improve environmental 
outcomes,65 resolve labor disputes,66 and encourage agreement on 
commercial or industrial developments.67 As the discussion in this article 
                                                                                                       
65  See, e.g., TOMAS M. KOONTZ ET AL., COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT: WHAT ROLES FOR GOVERNMENT? (2004); EDWARD WEBER, BRINGING 
SOCIETY BACK IN GRASSROOTS ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND 
SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES (2003); JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE, 
MAKING COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT (2000).  
66  DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 16. 
67  See, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & PATRICK FIELD, DEALING WITH AN ANGRY 
PUBLIC: THE MUTUAL GAINS APPROACH TO RESOLVING DISPUTES (1996). 
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proposes, approaches based on alternative dispute resolution principles offer 
several possible benefits. 
a) Focus on Mutual Goals in the Resolution Process 
According to Deborah Hensler, alternative dispute resolution stemmed 
from a 1960s populist movement that centered on the principle of returning 
the power to resolve a dispute back to the disputants.68 The proponents of 
this movement sought to substitute “mediative processes in which the 
disputants would fashion a solution to their problem for adjudicative 
processes that assign control of outcomes to a neutral third party.”69 The 
consequences of such processes, proponents argued, would be that 
disputants would “negotiate outcomes more appropriate to their situation, 
more satisfactory, and more likely to contribute to the continuation of long-
term relationships.”70 
Consensual mechanisms also minimize the influence of an outside party’s 
standards, values, and knowledge (or lack thereof) of the specific 
circumstances or technical issues involved in the dispute.71 As Hensler 
suggests above, the mediation mechanism can help parties identify mutual 
interests and maximize the use of local knowledge that could contribute to a 
solution agreeable to both parties.72 
b) Reduce Risks and Costs 
Other benefits of the alternative dispute resolution process are lower risks 
and lower costs of resolution.73 Formal adjudicative processes usually 
                                                                                                       
68  Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is There a Role for Alternative Dispute 
Resolution?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 178 (1991). 
69  Id. 
70  Id.  
71  Id. at 173–74.  
72  See id. at 178. 
73  E.g., Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1995). 
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require legal assistance and are often protracted due to court capacity and 
lengthy appeals processes.74 Some scholars caution that the high costs of 
court participation and the potential for delays may create unfair barriers to 
entry for citizens or public interest groups, discouraging those with 
legitimate claims from bringing them forward.75 In the case of 
whistleblowers, the availability of a lower cost and lower risk alternative 
may encourage those who might otherwise stay silent to speak out. 
c) Sustainable Outcomes 
Agreements reached through alternative dispute resolution are less likely 
to be appealed and more likely to be implemented than resolutions reached 
through the traditional system.76 Alternative dispute resolution may also 
increase trust and reciprocity in future interactions between disputing 
parties. In that sense, alternative dispute resolution processes could 
accelerate the circular process of normative change envisioned by Shapiro 
and Stone Sweet (and do so through a consensual approach to dispute 
resolution, rather than through precedent and rule change handed down by a 
third party). As discussed below, the Hanford example shows that resolving 
individual disputes in a consensual process may result in an agreement to 
examine and change the policies that initially gave rise to the dispute. 
III. OUTCOMES OF AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH  
The discussion below evaluates the outcomes achieved through the 
alternative dispute resolution approach at Hanford. It seeks to compare and 
contrast the outcomes that might be reached through the traditional system 
(i.e., formal claims and litigation) and the alternative, consensual approach 
                                                                                                       
74  See MARC GALANTER, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 119–25 (1974). 
75  See, e.g., EPP, supra note 40, at 25; GALANTER, supra note 74, at 119–25. 
76  See generally Shavell, supra note 73. 
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taken by the Hanford Council. This comparison proves challenging, as 
public records are accessible for formal court proceedings, but not for 
Council cases, which are protected under mediation proceedings as outlined 
in the Revised Code of Washington.77 As such, the comparisons in this 
article rely upon public records, reports published by the Hanford Council, 
and media accounts. 
A. Retaining Control over the Resolution 
As described in the introduction, the pipefitters’ underlying concerns 
about a Hanford manager’s disregard of safety specifications went 
unresolved as they proceeded through the traditional process of depositions, 
court hearings, and appeals. Because the adjudicatory process turns the 
decision-making authority over to a DOL investigator or judge, the 
resolution usually focuses on legal questions, such as wrongful dismissal 
and appropriate remedies. The adjudicator gains control over the resolution, 
and the resolution process generally discourages disputing parties from 
talking directly to each other or to the investigator.78 The shift of control 
fails to resolve the underlying problem that gave rise to the concerns.79 This 
is particularly troubling if workers perceive that serious health, safety, or 
environmental concerns may ultimately go unresolved even if they raise 
these concerns. 
One of the primary benefits of the Hanford Council process is its focus 
on resolving the underlying health, safety, or environmental concern rather 
than assigning blame. Such a focus meets the interests of all parties by 
establishing a resolution mechanism for disputes that “represent[] an 
                                                                                                       
77  WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.600 (2006). 
78  See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., WHISTLEBLOWER 
INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 3-15 to -17 (2011) (discussing representation by legal 
counsel). 
79  Shavell, supra note 73, at 8 (regarding parties learning more from each other during an 
ADR resolution process than through litigation). 
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important public policy concern, namely that whistleblowers be able to 
express their views and have issues addressed without retaliation.”80 
B. Costs to Resolving Disputes 
The eleven workers in the pipefitters’ case were ultimately awarded $6.2 
million, including reimbursement for legal fees.81 The award represents an 
average cost per employee of over $500 thousand, but does not include the 
funds spent by the contractor on legal fees or the cost of the time spent by 
management preparing for depositions and court hearings.82 Records 
obtained through public disclosure show that a sampling of cases “resolved 
through litigation or settlement in the late 1980s and early 1990s cost 
taxpayers an average of $500,000 in contractor legal fees and $60,000 to 
$600,000 in settlements or awards.”83 
In contrast, the Hanford Council process has a record of much smaller 
awards and expenses, aided in part by faster resolution times.84 As Council 
Chair Jonathan Brock noted, “[t]he average cost of a Council case 
resolution is about $33,000, about one-sixteenth of the direct legal costs of 
the cases that gave rise to its creation, even if the other direct and indirect 
costs and settlement costs are excluded.”85 
For the contractors, the most significant cost savings may be in the 
indirect costs of management time spent on litigation. Within the traditional 
system, “[f]or the companies, the indirect costs in management time . . . 
[were] measured in months, and the issues lingered for years.”86  Using the 
                                                                                                       
80  Brock, supra note 27, at 525. 
81  Cary, supra note 1. 
82  Id. 
83  Brock, supra note 27, at 499–500. 
84  See Taxpayer Benefit, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, 
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/work_benefit.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 
2012). 
85  Brock, supra note 27, at 499. 
86  Id. at 525. 
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Hanford Council system, however, “cumulative management time can be 
measured in days and the diversion from corporate obligations to site 
operations is negligible. The reputation of supervisors and managers—and 
public confidence in the company or the government—are no longer 
affected by motions, depositions, news stories, or periodic legislative 
inquires.”87 
 Whistleblowers benefit from the legal assistance and sense of legitimacy 
that public interest groups provide.88 Savings in terms of time and legal fees 
are also an important consideration for advocates, particularly if they are 
able to advance their larger goals for improved safety through a less 
expensive alternative mechanism.  
C. Building Trust over Time 
The development of trust over time, through repeat interactions and 
successful case resolutions, has benefited disputing parties and fostered 
long-term working relationships.89 Yet trust has not always been a constant 
in the Hanford Council. With a change of contractors, the original Hanford 
Council—the Hanford Joint Council—was dissolved in 2003, after having 
resolved over fifty cases over the prior nine years.90 The new contractor did 
not have a shared history of trust, nor had it experienced the conditions that 
prompted its predecessor to originally sign the Hanford Council charter.91 
But after only a year of relying on the traditional adjudicatory system to 
resolve disputes, the CEO of the new contractor, with the support of the 
                                                                                                       
87  Id. at 503. 
88  See, e.g., GLAZER & GLAZER, supra note 12, at  59, 170. 
89  PROGRESS REPORT 2010, supra note 19, at 6.  
90  HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT 2007 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/report_progressreport2007.pdf 
[hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT 2007]. 
91  See Brock, supra note 27, at 527–28. 
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DOE, initiated a process to reinstate an alternative mechanism.92 In June 
2005, the Hanford Concerns Council, modeled after the prior Hanford Joint 
Council, opened its doors for business.93 Some individuals who served as 
members of the Hanford Joint Council have become current members of the 
Hanford Council, and the cycle of building trust and long-term working 
relationships continues.94 
The Hanford Council’s 2007 progress report describes this cycle,  
Employees’ trust in the Council and its processes ultimately 
extended to the company representatives and managers, furthering 
DOE’s goals for the human performance initiative, which 
encourages open examination of operations and feedback. The 
increased trust, improved problem solving, and openness have 
contributed to a safety conscious work environment and translated 
directly to on-the-ground results.95 
 In fact, the outcomes of cases, and the processes for resolving them, 
appears to have accelerated the rate of normative change in worker 
protection practices. For example, in 2007, the government contractor and 
nuclear safety advocates on the Hanford Council commissioned a joint-
sponsored study of the scientific underpinnings of the worker protection 
practices at the Hanford tank farms.96 The parties signed a memorandum of 
understanding, and after a nationwide search, the Council selected a small 
panel of experts to conduct the review.97 The experts were tasked with 
                                                                                                       
92  New Independent Council to Resolve Wishtleblower Concerns, HANFORD CONCERNS 
COUNCIL (June 27, 2005), http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/press_ 
release20050627.pdf. 
93  Id. 
94  PROGRESS REPORT 2007, supra note 90, at 3. 
95  Id. at 11. 
96  See Press Release, Hanford Concerns Council, Independent Panel Reviews Technical 
Basis for Worker Protection Practices at Hanford Tank Farms (Sept. 29, 2008), available 
at http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/press_release20080929_ 
techreport.pdf. 
97  Id. 
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determining whether worker protection practices were consistent with 
industry best practices for setting exposure limits, and whether those limits 
were sufficiently conservative to be protective of workers.98 
As often happens in questions of environmental or public health 
protections, the parties learned that scientific certainty, particularly in a 
relatively unique and complex setting like Hanford, relies upon underlying 
assumptions and contains many caveats; and, where the science ends, value 
judgments begin.99 For example, the evidence prompted questions, such as, 
what is an acceptable level of uncertainty about the potential for unintended 
worker exposures?100 The Council has proven to be an ideal place for those 
discussions to take place and to effect changes in worker protection 
practices.101 
D. Legitimacy Embedded in the Dispute Resolution Process 
 Working on broad policy questions (such as worker safety practices) 
through a representative forum lends more legitimacy to outcomes than a 
court decision in an individual dispute. An alternative forum lends 
legitimacy in several ways. First, decisions emerging from a  representative 
forum may be more legitimate than those emerging from a more traditional 
forum, such as a court or administrative agency, because they are decided 
within a context that seeks to resolve the underlying concern, unlike 
individual court cases or administrative claims, which are adjudicated based 
                                                                                                       
98  Id. 
99 See, e.g., DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT 
ON SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH (2008); Wendy Wagner, The Perils of Relying 
on Interested Parties to Evaluate Scientific Quality, 95 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH S99 
(2005). 
100 See PATRICK N. BREYSSE ET AL., THE INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE CHEMICAL VAPOR 
TECHNICAL BASIS REVIEW REPORT (June 2008), available at http://www.hanford 
concernscouncil.org/download/report_techreviewfinal_20080929.pdf. 
101 Annette Cary, Review Helps Hanford Workers With Vapor Protection, TRI-CITY 
HERALD, Oct. 29, 2010, available at http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/ 
press_tricityherald20101029.pdf. 
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on the legal question at hand.  
Second, decisions made within the scope of the Hanford Council’s task 
must be reached through consensus and implemented per the charter 
agreement. Although the Charter provides some exemptions for 
“presumptive implementation” (such as if the consensus agreement violates 
a DOE rule), and allows the whistleblower to reject the Council’s decision, 
all cases resolved by the Council have been implemented to date. This 
history suggests that decisions reached through a consensus process, such as 
the Council’s, are less likely to be appealed. In contrast, the pipefitters’ case 
wended through the appellate courts until a decision was finally handed 
down from the Washington Supreme Court eleven years after the incident. 
The pipefitter’s case resulted in multiple appeals while the Council process 
has resulted in recommendations that are implemented per an ex-ante 
agreement. The Council process and consensus agreements have a record of 
successful implementation, and suggestions for improving worker 
protection practices are usually incorporated.102 In sum, the consensus 
process and ex-ante agreements, such as the charter and memoranda of 
understanding, have led to the successful resolution of dozens of cases and 
changes in worker protection practices. 
E. Sustainability of the Process and Mutually Agreeable Decisions 
Perhaps the most significant benefit of the Hanford Council’s alternative 
dispute resolution process is that it draws upon and furthers the mutual 
interests of all parties for the safe and efficient cleanup at Hanford. Because 
the process prompts a problem-solving focus rather than blame-assigning 
focus, the energies of all parties are directed at seeking mutual gains. 
Cases that utilize the adjudicatory mechanism can take years or decades 
                                                                                                       
102 Editorial, Council Ensures that Mediation Beats Litigation, TRI-CITY HERALD, Aug. 
12, 2008, available at http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/press_ 
tricityherald20080812.pdf. 
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to resolve,103 but the contention and mistrust they engender lasts far longer. 
Cases resolved using the Council mechanism allows for learning by 
managers of private contractors, which almost always results in system 
changes designed to correct underlying problems. 
As the Hanford Council’s review of worker protection practices 
demonstrates, long-term trust and relationships can lead to broader problem 
solving. The Council’s 2007 progress report affirms this notion, asserting 
that “[t]he interactions generated improved and productive problem-solving 
capabilities that will outlast the case resolution process.”104 In short, the 
kind of circular process for normative change envisioned by Shapiro and 
Stone Sweet is sustained, or even accelerated, through this alternative 
process. 
The following table summarizes some of the potential outcomes of 
traditional and alternative approaches to dispute resolution: 
 
Table 2. Summary of Potential Outcomes Resulting from Traditional 
Third Party Adjudication and Alternative Approaches 
 
Potential Consequences of 
Formal Third Party Adjudication 
Potential Consequences of 
Consensual Resolution 
Control: resolution process is 
subject to the standards, values, 
expertise, and judgment of a third 
party, and often encourages 
polarized viewpoints rather than 
mutual interests 
 
Control: resolution process allows 
for application of local knowledge, 
identification of mutual interests of 
the parties, and solutions appropriate 
for the situation 
                                                                                                       
103 See generally Annette Cary, Hanford Concerns Council Open for Business, TRI-CITY 
HERALD, June 28, 2005, available at  http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/ 
press_tricityherald20050628.pdf. 
104 PROGRESS REPORT 2007, supra note 90, at 9. 
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Costs: disputants face potentially 
increased costs in terms of time and 
legal fees, which some may argue 
discourages bringing legitimate 
disputes before a third party 
adjudicator 
Costs: disputants will pay  
potentially lower costs to  
participate in consensual forums, 
which some may argue encourages 
disputants to bring disputes forward 
that might otherwise be resolved 
dyadically 
Trust: because the third party 
adjudication system encourages 
polarized viewpoints, there is little 
opportunity to build trust or 
relationships that can help resolve 
future disputes  
Trust: because the disputants 
work together with the help of a 
third party, they often develop trust 
and norms which contribute to long-
term working relationships and an 
ability to resolve future disputes  
Legitimacy: since courts are often 
considered to be anti-majoritarian, 
as well as influential in important 
public policy issues via decisions 
rendered in individual cases, 
outcomes of adjudicatory processes 
can be criticized as illegitimate  
Legitimacy: since participants in 
the resolution process may include 
more than just the disputing parties 
themselves, the outcomes are often 
seen as more legitimate, especially 
if the resolution has broader policy 
implications 
Sustainability: because the 
disputing parties leave the final 
decision to a third party, they may 
be more likely to appeal a decision 
unfavorable to them or to refuse to 
implement the decision  
 
Sustainability: because the 
disputing parties work together to 
develop solutions, the outcomes are 
more likely to be implemented 
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  V. PRINCIPLES THAT MAY BE APPLIED IN ESTABLISHING 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN OTHER SETTINGS 
This article has explored conditions which may prompt a shift away from 
a traditional system of adjudication to an alternative mechanism for dispute 
resolution, as well as the potential consequences of such a shift. The 
Hanford Council example suggests that an alternative approach offers a 
number of beneficial outcomes that are often difficult to quantify, but that 
may accomplish a greater fulfillment of policy goals to protect workers and 
prevent accidents. The lessons learned from this example may help 
policymakers and stakeholders recognize when an alternative approach 
might work in addressing situations that involve repeat players in an 
ongoing dispute or struggle to effect change. These kinds of situations 
might include cleanup efforts at other toxic waste sites, production or 
transport of oil, or public safety issues, such as transportation or emergency 
preparedness. 
Rather than prescribing specific arrangements that may apply in these 
situations, this article outlines principles that could provide a foundation for 
constructing an alternative approach. These principles are derived both from 
lessons learned at the Hanford site, as well as the literature on dispute 
resolution. 
A. Focus on Mutual Gains 
The Hanford example and the alternative dispute resolution literature 
suggest that an alternative mechanism should recognize the parties’ interests 
in terms of their goals.105 If these interests are not being met using the 
traditional system of administrative claims or court proceedings, or if they 
                                                                                                       
105 See, e.g., ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1991) (discussing the benefits of alternative dispute resolution); 
GERALD W. CORMICK, BUILDING CONSENSUS FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: PUTTING 
PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE (1996); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., THE CONSENSUS 
BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT (1999). 
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could be better met by an alternative system, then conditions are ripe for the 
formation of a consensual mechanism. 
A focus on mutual interests is also supported by the notion of the 
“rational actor,” which suggests that individuals will seek to maximize their 
own interests. Institutional scholars have built upon the concept of a rational 
actor, and those embracing the “rational institutionalist” model posit that the 
relevant actors within an organization “have a fixed set of preferences or 
tastes, behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of 
these preferences, and do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes 
extensive calculation.”106 In other words, the rational institutionalist model, 
which expands from the individual to institution, suggests that organizations 
will originate and sustain based on “the value those functions have for the 
actors affected by the institution.”107 In sum, this view suggests that 
organizations are most likely to shift toward an alternative mechanism if 
key actors believe it is most likely to facilitate the achievement of 
organizational goals. 
A new mechanism should also be responsive to the conditions and 
concerns that gave rise to it. A history of past interactions shaped the 
perceptions and preferences of each actor in the Hanford example, and led 
to the embrace of an alternative mechanism. Since every situation involving 
ongoing conflict and historical contention will be different, consideration of 
the unique histories and perceptions of disputants will be important when 
establishing a charter or an ex-ante agreement. The Hanford Council has 
been successful in large part because advocates agreed to refer cases to the 
alternative mechanism and contractors agreed ex-ante to implement 
recommendations. 
                                                                                                       
106 Peter Hall & Rosemary Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 
44 POL. STUD. 936, 944–45 (1996). 
107 Id. at 945. 
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B. Foster Reciprocity 
Reciprocity can be fostered by “enlarging the shadow of the future” or 
“increasing the possibility and importance of future interactions.”108 This 
conception suggests that if disputing parties see the resolution of an 
individual dispute not as a single transaction, but as part of a series of repeat 
interactions, they will place greater emphasis on resolving disputes in a way 
that preserves their ability to resolve future disputes. In a formal 
adjudicatory setting, the shadow of the future is short, as the parties are 
likely to meet only in the courtroom. In the case of whistleblowers, this 
meeting often comes after working relationships have been severed and the 
parties have no expectation of working together in the future. An 
adjudicatory forum prompts the presentation of polarized views and a focus 
on narrow legal questions, with little focus on problem solving or future 
interactions. 
 One way to lengthen the “shadow of the future” is to concentrate 
interactions “so that relationships are built among small groups within the 
organization.”109 This concentration of interactions holds true of the model 
designed at Hanford, where delegates from the contractor and advocacy 
community serve three-year appointed terms on the Council, creating the 
opportunity and expectation of repeated interactions. By establishing an 
alternative forum that ensures ongoing interactions, such as individual 
dispute resolutions, parties are encouraged to understand the perspectives 
that contractors, advocates, and neutral members bring to the table. In fact, 
the Hanford Council experience suggests that these differing worldviews 
can contribute to a greater understanding between disputing parties and to a 
greater capacity for resolving disputes.110 The ex-ante agreement and 
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consensus requirement prompt not only understanding, but efforts to find 
mutually beneficial resolutions. In this way, trust and working relationships 
established through the Council process have led to ongoing reciprocity as 
described above, lengthening the shadow of the future. 
C. Assure Predictability 
Ex-ante agreements, charters, or rules of engagement that ensure 
predictable interactions are an important principle for an effective 
consensual mechanism. Written agreements can help ensure sustainability 
over time through predictable provisions for reaching resolution and 
implementing consensual decisions, and future adaptations. According to 
Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, such agreements can sustain institutions 
“by helping to identify the present and future behavior of other actors based 
on their preferences.”111 Hall and Taylor emphasize that “the institution 
enforces agreements and penalizes defections. In sum, institutions inform 
the individuals’ strategic decisions by providing some certainties about the 
strategies that other actors might employ.”112 
By following the principle of encouraging cooperative behavior through 
agreements, charters, procedures, or rules of engagement, parties can 
predict when and under what circumstances their interests might be met in a 
consensual process. At Hanford, assurances (such as criteria for accepting a 
case), consensus on resolutions, and “presumptive implementation” of 
Council resolutions are embodied in the Council charter,113 offering a 
degree of predictability for how others will participate in the resolution 
process. As a result, the Hanford Council mechanism (with the exception of 
a brief interruption due to a change of contractors) has sustained for nearly 
fifteen years, resolved over sixty cases, and improved safety for workers at 
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the nuclear site.114 
D. Ensure Legitimacy 
Those skeptical of mediation might argue that closed-door negotiations 
lack legitimacy. They might be concerned that agreements are not publicly 
available. Settlements achieved in this way do not set precedent for future 
cases, and will not contribute to rule change that ultimately affects future 
resolutions and broader governance. Therefore, it is important to consider 
the perceived legitimacy of a resolution process that affects broader public 
policy issues, such as worker safety and whistleblower protections.  
On the other hand, resolution through the traditional system of 
administrative filings and court proceedings can also be criticized as lacking 
legitimacy. For example, critics might suggest that rulings that affect future 
interactions and broader governance are best achieved through the 
legislative branch rather than through the courts.115  In other words, critics 
might suggest that court adjudication represents de facto policy making 
through an anti-majoritarian mechanism.116  
The Hanford Council addressed potential concerns about legitimacy by 
including repeat players in the resolution process of individual disputes in 
situations where there was ongoing conflict. Those most likely to be 
concerned with the legitimacy of an outcome are included. Further, 
resolutions that emerge from an alternative process are not construed as 
“creating law.” 
Concerns about legitimacy should be addressed during the formation of 
an alternative mechanism. If concerns about legitimacy are not addressed,  
disputing parties may not be willing to use the system or accept its 
resolutions. Parties outside the process must also view the system as 
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legitimate. If a forum for resolution does not have legitimacy, either through 
statutory grants of authority (in the case of administrative adjudication or 
court proceedings) or agreement among stakeholders (in the case of a 
consensual mechanism such as the Hanford Council), then those outside the 
process may not accept a resolution or its influence on future interactions. 
One way to help assure perceptions of legitimacy is to ensure that all 
perspectives are represented in an established consensual mechanism. This 
principle has thus far defrayed any criticism of illegitimacy at the Hanford 
site, particularly in outcomes that affect broader policies for worker 
protection. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article has examined traditional and alternative systems for resolving 
disputes, their theoretical underpinnings, and their potential outcomes. 
Building upon the example of whistleblower concerns at the Hanford 
Nuclear Site, this article has shown that an alternative form for resolving 
workplace concerns and disputes has effectively furthered the policy goal of 
protecting workers who raise concerns. Although this example has focused 
on a specific site and type of dispute, the lessons learned from the Hanford 
Council may be broadly applicable. 
The Hanford Council illustrates that an alternative approach based upon a 
consensual process can achieve the same ends as third party adjudication 
while at the same time allowing for a focus on problem-solving and future 
interactions. For example, the Hanford Council has provided an alternate 
venue for raising concerns while meeting the interests and mutual goals of 
the parties. For elected officials and agency leaders, the Council offers  
political cover by keeping highly polarized cases from leading to 
congressional hearings and media broadcast. Public interest advocates have 
benefitted from a lower cost forum that offers an opportunity to effect 
change in policies and practices that affect worker safety at the site. 
Additionally, the Hanford Council has met the needs of parties concerned 
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about predictable processes by using ex-ante agreements. It has prompted 
accelerated normative change by focusing on problem solving and larger 
policy implications. By participating in the consensus process, 
representatives from both the contractor and the advocacy communities 
have lent legitimacy to Council resolutions. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Hanford Council has lowered the cost and 
risk threshold for workers who wish to raise a concern. Workers at the site 
are not faced with a choice of remaining silent or engaging in a decade-long 
court battle if their concerns are not well received. The availability of this 
alternative helps to make real the rights granted to workers in ERA’s 
whistleblower provisions and helps to ensure that serious concerns can be 
heard and resolved by company leadership. In this latter respect, an 
alternative approach helps to further the goal of accident prevention that is 
implicit in whistleblower protection laws. 
This article has provided a framework for recognizing when an 
alternative approach might be used to resolve ongoing disputes at other 
sites. This could include other commercial and defense nuclear facilities, or 
sites that produce and ship oil, manufacture chemicals, or mines. This 
article proposes a set of principles upon which alternative mechanisms 
might be established—mechanisms that allow for concerns to be raised and 
dissenting voices to be heard in decision processes that govern hazardous 
sites or activities. The principles upon which an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism might be built—a focus on mutual interests and a 
commitment to fostering reciprocity, creating predictability, and ensuring 
legitimacy—may not only bring about resolution of existing disputes, but 
may also shape the course of future interactions and dispute resolutions.  
